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POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF PACIFIC ISLAND 
ELECTORAL LAWS1
JON FRAENKELAt first sight, the Pacific Islands seem like a 
graveyard for institutional determinist theories 
regarding the impact of electoral systems on party 
polarisation. Maurice Duverger’s well-known 
‘sociological law’ was that first-past-the-post 
electoral rules tend to deliver two-party systems. 
Proportional representation (PR) systems were 
more loosely associated with multi-party settings.2 
Yet in the Pacific, first-past-the-post using countries, 
such as the Solomon Islands and Papua New 
Guinea (1975-2002), have developed multiple-
party systems. The PR using territories of New 
Caledonia, French Polynesia and Vanuatu have, 
at times, veered towards a two-camp polarisation 
around the issue of independence. Some first-
past-the-post-using democracies, such as Palau 
and the Federated States of Micronesia, have 
not witnessed the emergence of any party-based 
system at all. Neighbouring Kiribati, Nauru and 
Tuvalu have similar styles of loose and fluctuating 
parliamentary alliances but no election-oriented 
political parties, despite the first using a two 
round electoral system, the second a unique 
simultaneously tallied preferential voting system, 
and the third a block voting system in two-member 
constituencies. Electoral laws would appear to 
exert negligible sway over Pacific party systems. 
On closer examination, Duverger’s theory does 
shed some light on the direction of electoral 
incentives in some of the Pacific countries, once 
hedged with the necessary qualifications and 
confined to appropriate settings. Negative cases, 
where electoral laws do not bring about the 
anticipated party structures are not confined to 
Oceania. India and Canada, for example, have 
numerous political parties, but use first-past-the-
post electoral systems. Guyana uses a list PR 
system but has a two-party centred system, as did 
Austria during 1945-1990. Much of the literature 
has consequently been aimed at heavily revising 
Duverger’s theories about the impact of electoral 
laws on party systems, either by emphasising 
that the critical association is in fact between 
district magnitude and the number of parties or 
by specifying the role of intervening variables, 
such as ethnic heterogeneity or the number of 
competing ‘issue dimensions’ to the political 
process.3 It is in situations where a single salient 
political cleavage (such as Labour/Conservative, or 
Catholic/Protestant) dominates the political order 
that distinct electoral laws may work in different 
directions, encouraging or limiting multi-partyism. 
In Fiji and New Caledonia, those varying electoral 
pressures on party systems exerted considerable 
influence over the success or failure of compacts 
aimed at mitigating ethnic conflict. 
In most South Pacific nations, the de-
colonisation issue did not prove an enduring 
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ideological influence over post-independence 
politics (except in Vanuatu, and, if we include 
countries still under some kind of colonial rule, 
New Caledonia and French Polynesia). Class 
politics nowhere proved a central cleavage 
regulating post-colonial political organisation, 
except plausibly within Fiji’s Indian community 
during the 1990s. Nor, again excepting ethnically 
bipolar Fiji, did other issues emerge which 
stimulated the formation of organisationally 
robust or durable alliances. In many cases, political 
parties remained either non-existent or they 
comprise only fleeting and regularly changing 
assembly groupings, commanding little loyalty 
or popular respect.4 ‘Party politics’, to the extent 
that it exists, is frequently viewed with disdain, 
and charged with aggravating social tensions that 
run counter to Pacific traditions of consensus 
and compromise. Fluidity of parliamentary 
alignments, and the readiness of MPs to ‘cross the 
floor’, ensure a frequent turnover of governments, 
particularly in western Melanesia but also in 
Nauru and Kiribati. The Pacific Island states 
have consequently eminently passed Samuel 
Huntington’s ‘two turnover’ test of democratic 
consolidation.5 Indeed, they have done so with 
too many flying colours; to such a degree that the 
primary concern is endemic instability, rather 
than the absence of regime change.
During the de-colonisation era, colonial 
authorities frequently anticipated and encouraged 
the emergence of local political parties, identifying 
these as a necessary counterpart of the removal of 
official majorities and post-independence political 
stabilisation.6 Drawing on experience in other 
parts of the world, analysts suggested that ‘the 
appearance of political parties in a democratic 
political system tends to be associated with the 
expansion of the franchise and the introduction 
of a significant elective element in national 
decision-making councils’.7 Party politics was 
often viewed as an evolutionary stage, and any 
sign of the crystallization of fleeting alliances or 
greater organisational rigour was seen as indicative 
of its imminent realisation.8 The lessons from 
20th century Western Europe or North America, 
after all, seemed to indicate the universality 
of party-centred political development, and 
elsewhere anti-colonial movements and/or labour 
movements often coalesced into political parties 
that served as governments-in-waiting and 
endured after the handover of power. Political 
parties are consequently frequently deemed 
indispensable for functioning democracies, 
both to provide linkages between citizens and 
their representatives and to facilitate collective 
decision-making.9
Influenced by such ideas, contemporary 
Pacific governments have introduced a range of 
reforms designed to strengthen political parties. 
Fiji’s 1995-6 Constitutional Review Commission, 
for example, gave a high priority to ‘recognition 
of the role of political parties’ in its choice of 
institutions capable of achieving ‘multi-ethnic 
government’.10 Parties, it was hoped, would 
serve as agents of moderation and inter-ethnic 
conciliation, and, to accomplish this, they were 
provided with considerable influence over the 
transfer of preference votes.11 As part of the 
new electoral system adopted in 1997-98, a 
split-format ballot paper was introduced, with 
an ‘above-the-line’ section enabling voters 
to indicate their support for party-endorsed 
preference schedules. The hope was that this 
would enhance political parties’ bargaining 
capacity and simultaneously encourage inter-
ethnic deals on politically sensitive policy issues. 
Constitutional rules governing the post-election 
formation of cabinets in Fiji also potentially had 
repercussions for the party system. All parties 
with more than 10% of seats were entitled to 
a proportional share of ministerial portfolios, 
implying a considerable disincentive for smaller 
parties and independent candidates. 
Papua New Guinea’s Organic Law on the 
Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates 
(OLIPPC) is the most ambitious of the 
contemporary party engineering projects in the 
Pacific. MPs are given financial incentives to join 
political parties, and are required to toe the party 
line during critical votes in parliament, including 
those on motions of no confidence, constitutional 
amendments and budgets. PNG’s reforms, and 
the underlying concerns that inspire these, also 
influence the reform-oriented discourse elsewhere 
in the region. Standing orders already limit 
scope for ‘no confidence’ votes in the Solomon 
Islands, and similar laws were debated under 
Serge Vohor’s short-lived government in Vanuatu 
in 2004. In Samoa, the governing Human Rights 
Protection Party in 1995 facilitated the passage 
of legislation obliging candidates to specify their 
allegiance with the objective of enhancing the 
electoral significance of political parties. Samoa, 
Fiji and New Zealand have adopted laws against 
party-hopping, with a view to strengthening 
party parliamentary organisation and diminishing 
government instability12. The ‘strengthening of 
parties’ is frequently a smokescreen for reforms 
aimed at consolidating the grip of executives 
(or incumbent parties). Given the threat of 
instability associated with recurrent regime 
change and the often gridlocked nature of 
governments threatened by ‘no confidence’ 
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strengthening party systems. For each region, 
the paper surveys in brief all countries, but 
focuses in detail on one or two countries in 
which particularly topical electoral issues arise. 
As an antidote to the approach of setting up the 
familiar party-based model, and then examining 
the extent to which Pacific politics achieves 
that style of organisation, we examine first the 
challenges, such reforms (with or without the 
smokescreen) have often understandably found 
tacit support amongst donors and diplomats from 
neighbouring metropolitan powers. 
This working paper surveys the range of 
electoral system types and party structures across 
the Pacific Islands and considers the viability 
of contemporary electoral reforms aimed at 
Table 1. Electoral Systems, Effective Number of Political Parties & Extent of Party Preponderance 
in Paciﬁc Islands Legislative Assemblies 
Country/Territory  Electoral  Year       ‘Effective’ Party   
     System        No. Parties Preponderance   
       (1)   (2)      (3)       (4)
American Samoa (USA) FPP  N/P      0.0  0.00 
Cook Islands    FPP  1999      2.6  1.00 
Fed. States of Micronesia FPP  N/P      0.0  0.00 
Fiji    AV  2001      2.7  0.96 
French Polynesia (France) LPR1  2001      2.3  1.00 
Guam (USA)   BV  2002      1.9  1.00 
Kiribati   TRS2  1998      2.0  0.64 
Marshall Islands  FPP/BV  1999      1.0  0.55 
Nauru   STPV  N/P      0.0  0.00 
New Caledonia (France) LPR  1999      4.5  1.00 
Niue (NZ)   FPP/BV  N/P      0.0  0.00 
Comm. Northern Marianas FPP  2003      2.5  1.00 
Palau   FPP  N/P      0.0  0.00 
Papua New Guinea  FPP  2002      10.0  0.79 
Pitcairn Islands  SNTV  N/P      0.0  0.00 
Samoa   FPP/BV  2002      1.9  0.73 
Solomon Islands  FPP  2001      3.3  0.98 
Tonga   FPP/BV  2002      1.03  0.78 
Tuvalu   FPP/BV  N/P      0.0  0.00 
Vanuatu   SNTV  2004      6.9  0.85 
Wallis & Futuna (France) LPR  2002      1.8  1.00 
    
Source; Levine, S. & Roberts, N. ‘The Constitutional Structures and Electoral Systems of the 
Pacific Islands’, Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, 43 (3), 2005; Reynolds, A., Reilly, 
B., Ellis, A., Electoral System Design; The New International IDEA Handbook, IDEA, 2005, Annex A, 
p166-73; Szajkowski, B., (ed) Political Parties of the World, John Harper, 5th edition 2005 (1st edition 
– 1980); Taagepera, R., Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems, New Haven, 
Yale University Press, 1989, p78-79.
Notes; FPP – First-past-the-post, AV – Alternative Vote, LPR – List proportional representation, 
BV – Block vote, TRS – Two round system, STPV – Simultaneously tallied preferential vote, SNTV 
– Single non-transferable vote. N/P – No party system. The Laakso/Taagepera index is one minus the 
sum of squared seat shares, with independents calculated as parties with single seats. The index shown 
here is adjusted by excluding independents, and by weighting parties by their share in the total seats 
secured by parties in assemblies. The party preponderance index (column 4) shows party affiliated MPs 
divided by total parliamentary membership (with 1.0 conveyed an entirely party-centred system and 
0.0 indicating an entirely non-party system). Election years are the latest recorded in the 2005 edition 
of Political Parties of the World.  
1 With 30% plurality Seat Bonus
2 Block vote with second round in several multi-member constituencies.
3 Only the 9 universal franchise seats are counted, and, in this context, the Human Rights and Democracy Movement 
is counted as a political party.
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western and northern independent Pacific states 
where political parties are of least significance, 
and then look at those Polynesian countries 
where political parties have assumed greater 
significance before focussing on the most strongly 
party-centred ethnically bipolar states of Fiji and 
New Caledonia. 
Table 1 surveys the types of electoral system 
used in legislative elections across the region. 
First-past-the-post systems (used in single-member 
districts) are the most frequent arrangement, 
although often combined with a number of block 
voting districts (with multiple members), where 
eligible citizens have as many votes as there are 
seats. Guam, where citizens have 15 votes to fill 
15 places, has the most sizeable of such districts, 
but Majuro in the Marshall Islands elects five 
members and tiny Niue has a six-member island-
wide constituency, as well as separate single-
member village-based constituencies. Vanuatu 
and the Pitcairn Islands have multiple-member 
constituencies combined with only a single 
vote for each eligible citizen (i.e., single non-
transferable vote systems). Kiribati has a multi-
member block-vote district system, but uses a 
second round of voting where necessary. Both 
Fiji and PNG have adopted the alternative vote, 
which involves the redistribution of preference 
votes, either until majorities are secured (Fiji) 
or until ballots are exhausted (PNG).13 Nauru’s 
preferential system is distinctive, both because 
it uses multi-member constituencies and because 
all preferences are simultaneously counted. 
New Caledonia, French Polynesia and Wallis 
and Futuna use list PR systems for territorial 
elections. Voters back a single party, and the 
proportion of candidates elected from that 
party’s list depends on its district percentage of 
the vote. These countries also have the largest 
constituencies in the Pacific: for example, 37-
members are returned by French Polynesia’s 
Windward Islands (Tahiti and Mo’orea), and 
32 Congress members are elected from New 
Caledonia’s Southern Province. All three French 
territories also participate in metropolitan French 
elections, which entail a two round system both 
for legislative and presidential elections.
Table 1 also constructs an index for the 
‘effective’ number of parties using an adjusted 
variant of the widely used Laakso/Taagepera 
index combined with data covering distribution 
of seats by political party recorded in the 2005 
Political Parties of the World. The Laakso/Taagepera 
index aims at obtaining a meaningful composite 
number so as to establish whether each country 
has a two- or a multi-party system. For example, 
a country with 3 parties which secure 55%, 45% 
and 5% of seats is shown as having a 2.2 party 
system, rather than a 3 party system. The results 
are inevitably as good or as bad as the underlying 
data, in the sense that for some Pacific states the 
‘parties’ recorded existed merely on paper.14 Since 
party vote shares are impossible to meaningfully 
establish for the more fluid party systems, the 
index is calculated using party seat shares.15 
The standard Laakso/Taagepera index is not 
well honed to deal with situations where a large 
number of independents enter parliament. To 
handle this, column (3) removes independents 
from the calculation while column (4) indicates 
the preponderance of the party system. Hence, for 
example, PNG’s 22 parties which secured seats at 
the 2002 polls (including many single- or two-
seat parties) once weighted to yield an adjusted 
Laakso/Taagepera measure suggest a 10 party 
system, whereas column (4) tells us that 79% of 
PNG MPs were affiliated to political parties and 
that the residual, 21%, were independents. 
In terms of the robustness of party political 
organisation, the Pacific states straddle a range 
that extends from relatively strongly party-
centred polities (such as Fiji and New Caledonia, 
where bipolar ethnic frictions have, historically, 
encouraged the emergence of relatively strong 
party organisations) to no-party or only nominally 
party-based systems (such as PNG, Solomon 
Islands, Palau, Nauru and the Federated States 
of Micronesia). Political parties are regularly 
provided for in Pacific constitutions. Even where 
they are not envisaged, other legislative provisions 
may facilitate the emergence of assembly 
groupings. The cohesion of ‘the opposition’ is 
often encouraged, for example, by provisions 
regarding the establishment of an ‘Office of the 
Leader of the Opposition’, and laws regulating 
the competitive selection of the ‘Leader of the 
Opposition’. In the Solomon Islands, provisions 
under the 1978 constitution for the ‘Leader of 
the Independents’, oddly, encouraged the quasi-
party style functioning of reputedly non-aligned 
MPs. After general elections, independents 
operate virtually like the country’s loosely knit 
political parties, and come together in the 
capital, Honiara, to select their own, or back 
another, candidate for the premiership. Similarly 
in Samoa, a Samoan United Independents 
Party emerged after the 2001 polls, although 
laws against post-electoral party formation were 
used by the government to declare illegal its 
subsequent efforts to form a new party together 
with the major opposition party. As we have 
seen, legislation aimed at strengthening political 
parties has been widely adopted across the region, 
whether it be through direct financial incentives 
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for party-aligned candidates or, indirectly, by 
rules prohibiting ‘party-hopping’, ‘grace periods’ 
and other restraints on ‘no confidence’ votes.
MELANESIA 
PNG
Papua New Guinea used an optional 
preferential voting system in elections held in 
1964, 1968 and 1972, but then switched to a 
first-past-the-post system in 1975.16 The number 
of candidates contesting elections subsequently 
increased at every election, reaching an average 
of 27 per constituency at the 2002 polls. Numbers 
of victors obtaining over 50% of the vote 
declined, with the majority of MPs being elected 
on the basis of less than 20% of the vote in 
1992, 1997 and 2002. National elections became 
vehicles for the articulation of clan rivalries, 
particularly in the highlands. Parties proved, at 
most, loose associations, which politicians were 
readily willing to ditch in pursuit of ministerial 
portfolios. Customary ‘big men’ competed for 
wealth, influence and authority through electoral 
processes, driven by pecuniary rewards attached 
to state office-holding.17 Whether or not they 
joined nominal political parties, victors’ positions 
remained highly precarious. Over half all MPs lost 
their seats at most elections since independence, 
with incumbent turnover reaching an all time 
high of 75% at the 2002 polls. 
Inside parliament, politicians frequently steer 
clear of political parties, or form fleeting party 
attachments that play second fiddle to personal 
advancement. No single party has ever obtained 
an absolute majority in parliament. PNG had 
ten governments from 1975 to 2002, three of 
which were dislodged by votes of ‘no confidence’. 
Governments are frequently formed by back-room 
cabals (or ‘lock-ups’), which proceed to divide 
amongst themselves the spoils of office. MPs on 
the opposition benches thus have every incentive, 
and little institutional inhibition, to plot the next 
‘no confidence’ bid. Many prefer to sit on the 
‘middle benches’, in a twilight position between 
government and opposition, hoping to secure 
ministerial portfolios at the next reshuffle.18 Instead 
of yielding the frequently anticipated advantage of 
strong and stable government (due to seat swings 
which enhance or magnify narrower vote swings), 
the first-past-the-post system provides instead 
the backdrop for a highly volatile parliamentary 
set-up, in which unscrupulous and opportunistic 
‘rubber band’ or ‘yo-yo’ politicians prove willing 
to repeatedly switch allegiances for personal or 
constituency gain. 
As a result, Papua New Guinean reformists 
have taken steps to strengthen the party system. 
The Organic Law on the Integrity of Political 
Parties and Candidates (OLIPPC) was enacted in 
2002, and aimed at strengthening political parties 
via controls over funding and restrictions on party-
hopping. Those who contest as members of parties 
receive state financial support. Independents do 
not. Once a vote has been held for a Prime 
Minister, MPs are obliged to follow the party 
line on budgetary and constitutional votes, and 
in votes of no confidence. Cases involving MPs 
who cross the floor or fail to follow the party 
whip on these issues are heard by an Ombudsman 
Commission and then, if necessary, referred to a 
Leadership Tribunal, with the ultimate sanction 
being the forfeit of seats. New rules are aimed 
at restricting post-election horse-trading, by 
giving the party with the largest number of 
seats the considerable advantage of having the 
first opportunity to form a government. One 
consequence, already witnessed at the 2002 polls, 
was a sizeable increase in the official number of 
political parties, which rose from 12 in 1997 to 43 
in 2002, although many of these existed only on 
paper and failed to obtain a single MP. The rules 
have proved difficult to implement, and much 
party side-switching continues, either illegally or 
(where this is sanctioned collectively by a party) 
legally.19
A limited preferential voting system (LPV) 
was also introduced, and came into effect in the 
wake of the 2002 general elections. It was aimed 
chiefly at avoiding the proliferation of MPs 
elected on the basis of less than 10% or 20% 
of the vote. To cast a valid (or formal) ballot, 
citizens are required to list three candidates in 
order of preference (incomplete ballots with only 
1 or 2 preferences marked are to be discarded 
as invalid or informal). If no candidate gets a 
majority of first preference votes, the lowest 
polling candidate is eliminated and his or her 
voters’ 2nd preference votes are redistributed 
among the remaining candidates. This process of 
elimination and redistribution of votes continues 
until one candidate obtains 50%+1 of the total 
vote. PNG’s new electoral system is aimed at 
encouraging more moderate or conciliatory 
candidates, who reach out beyond their core 
bases of support in the hope of obtaining 2nd or 
3rd preference votes from other communities. 
Both reforms, in different ways, anticipate and 
encourage a more issue- and/or party-based 
political culture. Just as the candidate with 
the broader appeal is anticipated, after the 
introduction of LPV, to pick up preference votes 
outside his or her community, so too the more 
broadly-aligned party MP is to receive financial 
encouragement under OLIPPC.
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Implicit in the philosophy behind the 
introduction of OLIPPC and LPV is the view 
that Westminster-style political organisation 
and the first-past-the-post system were in fact 
responsible for vote-splintering among numerous 
candidates, high incumbent turnover and 
volatile allegiances inside parliament.20 If these 
are shown to owe their origin to inappropriate 
electoral laws or the constitutional set-up, then 
institutional change would appear to be a viable 
method of broadening the basis of parliamentary 
representation and stabilising governments. If 
those features have other origins, the two reforms 
are likely to do more to change the form, 
rather than the substance, of PNG politics. 
Claims that electoral rules were responsible for 
PNG’s hyper-fractionalised party space sit oddly 
next to the Duvergerian association between 
plurality rules and a two-party system, suggesting 
that the ultimate origin of vote-splintering lies 
elsewhere. Variations in the financial incentive 
structure made little difference in the past. As 
Ron May points out, even a tenfold rise in the 
PNG nomination fee in 1991 did little to arrest 
candidate proliferation.21 
Solomon Islands
In the Solomon Islands, as in PNG, the 
political spectrum at the national level lacks 
the enduring ideological cleavages necessary 
to facilitate the emergence of a stable party 
structure, partly because customary leadership 
systems are so individualised and partly because 
political allegiances are so localised. The 
political parties that emerged around the time of 
independence were loose associations clustered 
around political leaders like Solomon Mamaloni 
and Bartholomew Ulufa’alu. Owing to the spread 
of parliamentary constituencies and the strength 
of regional loyalties, governments had to be 
formed that drew on alliances across the group, 
in particular balancing the interests of populous 
Malaita against those of the Western Province 
and Guadalcanal. Those parties which did 
emerge usually lacked branch structures and did 
not have the kind of regional spread that would 
assist the formation of single-party governments. 
Peter Kenilorea, a former civil servant from the 
Are’are District on Malaita who was initially an 
avowed opponent of ‘party politics’,22 secured the 
premiership after elections in 1976 and 1980, 
although he lacked strong party backing. In 
1981, ministerial defections brought down his 
government.23 Arch-rival Solomon Mamaloni, 
from Makira, replaced Kenilorea as Prime 
Minister, and his three terms in office proved 
critical in shaping the post-independence-style 
of Solomon Islands governance.
As Jeffrey Steeves has shown, the post-
colonial Solomon Islands became an arena of 
so-called ‘unbounded politics’, based on the 
weaving together of fragile power bases that 
drew on personal allegiances.24 As in PNG, party 
attachments proved of limited significance and 
loyalties regularly changed. MP’s positions were 
highly precarious, with around 50% losing their 
seats at each election. Parliamentarians were 
much less likely to face defeat if they sat on the 
government benches, and were often prepared to 
abandon party allegiances to achieve that goal. 
Ministerial portfolios offered access to state funds 
or other government controlled public service 
networks which permitted the forging of ‘big 
man’ networks of patronage. Prime Ministers’ 
survival depended on judicious distribution of 
cabinet portfolios and other state appointments, 
as well as forging links with powerful local or 
foreign business interests.
Nevertheless, the opposition was not entirely 
‘unbounded’ by party or principle. In 1997, 
a reformist coalition came into office headed 
by Bartholomew Ulufa’alu. It sought to reduce 
the country’s crippling debt, reduce the rate 
of log extraction and restructure government 
finances. But from late 1998, the Solomon 
Islands became increasing engulfed in conflict, 
first on Guadalcanal and then also on Malaita 
and in the Western Province. On June 5th 2000, 
the Ulufa’alu government was overthrown by 
a ‘Joint Operation’ involving the paramilitary 
wing of the police force and Malaitan militia 
groups, and replaced by a government under the 
control of the militia groups. Following elections 
held in December 2001, a new government 
headed by former ‘Mamaloni man’, Allan 
Kemakeza, secured office, relying on support 
from the PAP and independents. Both post-coup 
governments relied on personalised mechanisms 
for procuring political allegiance, although now 
with the added need to buy off increasingly 
intransigent militants roaming the streets of 
Honiara or hanging around with guns outside the 
Finance Ministry and the Prime Minister’s office. 
Although an Australian-led Regional Assistance 
Mission to the Solomon Islands arrived in mid-
2003, disarmed and arrested most of the militants 
and took some steps to clean up government 
finances, Kemakeza survived as Prime Minister. 
Indeed, the stabilisation of the security situation 
initially strengthened his administration, with a 
number of former opposition leaders crossing the 
floor to join the government.25 
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splits that arose in the Vanua’aku Pati (VP) were 
the result of top level power struggles between 
Walter Lini, Barak Sope and the rest of the 
VP leadership, rather than grass roots-driven 
splintering due to the incentives arising from the 
SNTV system. Ni-Vanuatu politicians’ frequent 
shifts of allegiance, the willingness of party-
aligned MPs to cross the floor and continual 
actual or threatened ‘no confidence’ challenges 
were, after all, characteristic also of neighbouring 
first-past-the-post using Melanesian countries. 
SNTV provided a considerable degree of seats/
votes proportionality at elections held in 1979, 
1983 and 1987, and only in the subsequent years 
did it become less effective in this respect. As 
the number of candidates contesting elections 
rose, the former disciplined party adjustments 
to predicted voter base gave way to a free-for-
all, with candidates potentially able to secure 
election on the basis of only a small share of 
the vote. Despite the distinct electoral systems, 
this cumulative and self-reinforcing candidate 
multiplication was common to Vanuatu, Solomon 
Islands and PNG.  
MICRONESIA
In most of the North Pacific states which 
have ‘Compacts of Free Association’ with the 
United States, plurality-based electoral systems 
have not triggered the emergence of political 
parties. The key bases for political organisation in 
the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) are the 
separate states of Chuuk, Pohnpei, Kosrae and Yap, 
or further sub-groupings, but the federal assembly 
is dominated by individual power-brokers with 
fluctuating allegiances.30 In Palau, the ‘Compact 
of Free Association’ with the United States and 
the nuclear-free status question for a time proved 
strongly polarizing issues. The Compact was rejected 
at seven referenda, before being passed in 1993. 
During the 1980s and early 1990s, loose groupings 
did come together in support of, and opposition 
to, the signing of the Compact. Yet, as in FSM, 
shifting loyalties were centred on ‘family, clan and 
village ties more than party affiliation’, and ‘some 
elected leaders, who do not hold chiefly titles, 
win and hold office because they are supported 
by and represent the interests of traditional power 
structures’.31 In the two northernmost territories, 
Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern 
Marianas (CNMI), tighter integration with the 
United States encouraged ascendancy of American-
style parties. 
Of the American-associated Micronesian 
countries, only the Republic of the Marshall 
Vanuatu
Vanuatu (formerly the New Hebrides) adopted 
an electoral system in the mid 1970s that is often 
believed to promote intra-party competition.26 
The single non-transferable vote system (SNTV) 
allows eligible citizens a single vote, but in multi-
member constituencies.27 The system has peculiar 
repercussions for party strategy. Parties must more 
or less accurately anticipate the extent of their 
electoral support in each constituency, and, where 
they are potentially able to secure more than one 
seat, need to be capable of directing different 
groups of voters to support each strategically 
preferred candidate. If party A potentially has 
78% support in a four-member constituency, it 
might obtain maximum advantage by fielding 
three candidates and directing precisely a third of 
its potential voters to evenly back each favoured 
candidate (so that each gets 26%). SNTV is 
crudely proportional, because party B, if it has 
the residual 22% support, is potentially capable 
of returning one of the four victorious candidates. 
The system was introduced in order to ensure 
some representation for the francophone minority, 
and to prevent a clean sweep in favour of the 
Anglophone Vanua’aku Pati (as would have 
been likely under a first-past-the-post system). 
Although only crudely proportional, SNTV does 
have the advantage of simplicity, and removed 
the need to divide Vanuatu’s ethnically inter-
mixed islands into separate constituencies.28 
For the first 11 years after independence 
(1980), Vanuatu’s two major groupings were 
the predominantly English-speaking Vanua’aku 
Pati (VP) and an alliance of francophone-
backed parties, the Union of Moderate Parties 
(UMP). Despite exceptional ethno-linguistic 
heterogeneity and allegiances to varying Christian 
Church denominations, the polarising issues of 
independence and land rights encouraged the 
temporary advent of a two-party system. Until 
1991, the VP and UMP together controlled 
the bulk of the national vote. From then 
onwards, Vanuatu’s two-party system splintered, 
with numerous rival party groupings emerging 
and a rising number of successful independent 
candidates. Owing to the emergence of an 
increasingly fractionalised party system, coalition 
governments became a permanent feature from 
1991 and there were at least 16 wholesale changes 
of government between 1991 and 2004.  
Whether those splits and that instability 
are due to the usage of the SNTV system is 
debatable. SNTV rewards minor parties with 
concentrated regional bases of support and, 
potentially, promotes internal party rivalry and 
splintering.29 But the late 1980s and early 1990s 
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Islands has developed a locally-based two party 
system. In the wake of the death of long-serving 
President Amata Kabua, local political struggles 
culminated in the formation of the reformist 
United Democratic Party (UDP), which won 
the 1999 election.32 At fresh elections in 2003, 
the UDP was able to retain office, defeating 
the Kwajalein and other Ralik Chain chiefs 
who, for the first time, aligned themselves 
in a political party, the Ailin Kein Ad.33 The 
renewal of the Marshall Islands’ ‘Compact of 
Free Association’ with the United States in 
mid-2003 and the issue of ‘rental’ payments for 
US usage of Kwajalein Atoll as a missile testing 
facility, alongside controversies about the decline 
of chiefly political authority, proved sufficiently 
polarising to, at least temporarily, bring about the 
development of a two party system.34
Across the equator to the south, the Kiribati 
two-round electoral system coupled with 
a preferential ballot for nominations for the 
presidency that was introduced to provide some 
choice despite the absence of organised party 
politics.35 In the multi-member constituencies, 
candidates are elected if they obtain the required 
threshold of valid votes. If not, run off elections 
are held for the top candidates.36 Political parties 
initially proved occasional alliances of convenience 
between national politicians, lacking popular 
membership and regularly fading away.37 Only 
after elections, when MPs gather together on the 
island of Tarawa did ‘the factions behave most like 
political parties’.38 Cleavages between Catholics 
from the northern islands and Protestants from 
the south underpinned early post-independence 
politics, but did not lead to the emergence of 
confessional parties.39 Towards the turn of the 
century, parties assumed greater institutional 
coherence, adopting constitutions, establishing 
party offices, circulating newsletters and retaining 
a membership outside parliament.40 
Nauru’s electoral system requires voters to 
rank all candidates in order of preference in 
seven two-member constituencies and one four-
member constituency, a system which has been 
compared to that invented by 19th century 
French mathematician Jean-Charles de Borda.41 
Voters’ first preferences are counted as 1, second 
preferences as a half vote, third preferences as a 
third of a vote, fourth preferences as quarter vote 
and so on dependent on the number of candidates, 
and all votes are instantly summed with the 
victor being the candidate with the highest total. 
Unlike the Borda system, Nauru unusually allots 
fractional votes even to a candidate who comes 
last (for example, the loser in a constituency with 
eight contestants gets an eighth of the vote) and 
voters in multi-member constituencies only have 
a single vote. 
Nauru is most frequently classified as a ‘no 
party’ system.42 After independence, traditional 
leaders led by Hammer de DeRoburt, mostly former 
councillors from the Nauru Local Government 
Council, were elected to the new parliament. 
They dominated the country’s politics for the 
next twenty years.43 After DeRoburt’s defeat in 
1989, Bernard Dowiyogo served for six terms, 
with several breaks, until he was replaced by 
Rene Harris in March 2001. From then onwards, 
the once phosphate-rich territory experienced 
mounting financial crisis and repeated regime 
change. In 2002 alone, for example, there were 
seven changes in the presidency. 
Against this backdrop, a group calling itself 
the ‘visionaries’ eventually toppled the old 
guard politicians associated with Rene Harris in 
2004, after a series of legal confrontations and 
controversies surrounding the role of the Speaker 
of parliament. At the 2004 polls, there were few 
first-count leaders who were dislodged by the 
counting of lower-order preferences, suggesting 
that a first-past-the-post system would have 
yielded similar outcomes. Nauru’s electoral system 
has been described as ‘absurdly complex’ for such 
a small country.44 Yet much of the discussion 
about the merits of Jean-Charles de Borda’s 
proposed voting system concerns its application 
to committee elections.45 There is no particular 
reason why small size should be a deterrent to 
usage of complex systems. It is when they are 
applied to mass elections, or where literacy is low, 
that elaborate voting rules potentially become 
troublesome. 
POLYNESIA 
Plurality-based electoral systems also prevail 
across Polynesia, with the exception of the 
French-controlled group towards the east. 
Largely block vote based systems exist in Tonga 
and Tuvalu, whereas Samoa has a majority of 
single member first-past-the-post-based districts 
with only a few multi-member constituencies.46 
Tonga’s electoral system entitles ‘commoners’ 
to elect only nine representatives on a universal 
franchise. Another nine are returned by the 
holders of 33 noble titles,47 and twelve are 
nominated by the King. The King’s nominees to 
cabinet sit in the Legislative Assembly, but the 
executive is not answerable to the legislature. 
Contrary to popular belief, the prevailing seat 
distribution is not entrenched in the country’s 
1875 constitution, and the balance between the 
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different categories of members has witnessed 
major changes, most notably in 1915 when a 
revision of the composition of the assembly was 
aimed at enhancing the power of the monarch 
over that of the nobility.48 Since the 1980s, a 
pro-democracy movement has emerged (lately 
calling itself the Human Rights and Democracy 
Movement). Pro-reform candidates took eight of 
the nine universal franchise seats in 2005, and, 
for the first time, two were allowed to join the 
cabinet (and required to forfeit their universal 
franchise seats to do so. They instead appeared 
amongst the king’s nominees). 
In Tonga, as in Samoa, the Cook Islands and 
Niue, overseas migration is a major influence on 
domestic politics. Around 50% of Tongans and 
Samoans reside overseas, as do the overwhelming 
majority of Cook Islanders and Niueans. Tiny 
Niue has around 1,400 residents but around 18,477 
migrants living in New Zealand who are not 
entitled to vote. It has a 20-member parliament, 
with fourteen members returned from single 
member village constituencies and six ‘common 
roll’ MPs elected on an island-wide block vote. 
Party labels designate loose assembly groupings, 
although these are occasionally thought to be 
sufficiently robust for ‘party politics’ to be blamed 
for exacerbating social tensions.49 
With a population of less than 10,000, Tuvalu 
has seven two-member constituencies and one 
single-member constituency, all of which return 
members by plurality voting (i.e., the block vote 
in the two-member districts).50 There are no 
political parties, but both members from each of 
the seven dual-member constituencies tend to 
align themselves on the same side during Prime 
Ministerial elections. Although close to a third 
of Tuvalu’s population live on Funafuti, where 
the capital is located, citizens are obliged to vote 
on their home islands unless they own land or 
show evidence of five-years residence. Within 
parliament, MPs frequently divide on north/south 
lines, with most Prime Ministers coming from the 
southern part of the group (and most Governor-
Generals coming from the north).51 Despite the 
absence of a party system, Tuvalu’s parliament 
has been finely balanced between pro- and anti-
government MPs. Between 1999 and 2002, 
there were four different Prime Ministers, and 
parliamentary sessions were frequently cancelled 
or curtailed to avoid the threat of ‘no confidence’ 
challenges. That instability has generated local 
debate about introducing laws preventing MPs 
from switching sides, which – given the absence 
of parties – would presumably entail members 
sticking by whichever candidate they backed for 
the premiership after general elections.
The Cook Islands, with a plurality-based 
system, developed a two-party system shortly 
after self-government in 1965. Albert Henry’s 
Cook Islands Party (CIP) controlled the 
government but, during the 1970s, was opposed 
by the minority Democratic Party, which obtained 
office after a court ruling concerning electoral 
irregularities associated with using government 
funds to finance fly-in migrant voters from New 
Zealand at the 1978 polls. The CIP recaptured 
office in 1983, but defections and ‘no confidence’ 
challenges became an increasingly regular 
feature, encouraged by difficulties in securing 
parliamentary majorities after the emergence of 
a third party, the Alliance Party, in the 1990s.52 
The major electoral system changes during this 
period were (i) the abolition of block voting 
in multi-member districts in favour of single-
member districts in 1981, a reform which has 
been claimed to have encouraged ‘more parochial 
politicians’,53 and (ii) the introduction (1981) 
and subsequent abolition (2004) of a special 
seat for overseas voters. Despite having a party-
based system, the Cook Islands suffers from 
the difficulties often attributed to the absence 
of party politics elsewhere; regular changes of 
government, fluid allegiances and parliamentary 
opposition groupings that are too preoccupied 
with over-turning incumbent governments to 
play much role in scrutinizing legislation.
Samoa
After independence, Samoa adopted a 
plurality-based system involving a mixture of 
single-member and block voting two-member 
constituencies.54 The country initially witnessed 
high levels of MP turnover and no-party-based 
contests as in many parts of Melanesia. The 
key difference was in the relationship between 
electoral processes and customary leadership. 
In 1961, a popular referendum backed usage 
of an electoral system in which only matai 
(chiefs) could vote and stand as candidates. In 
1990, another popular referendum supported 
the introduction of a universal franchise, but 
retention of the matai-based qualification for 
candidates. Interestingly, the electoral system 
became much more competitive and party-based 
even before the 1990 extension of the franchise. 
Until the mid-1970s, large numbers of MPs were 
returned from non-contested constituencies, 
often based on a rotational principle of villages 
taking it in turns to fill seats. After the mid-
1970s, the number of non-contested seats 
fell and the number of candidates contesting 
elections rose rapidly. Similarly, in the initial 
post-independence years, the premiership proved 
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a unique preserve of tama-a-‘aiga title-holders 
from Samoa’s four leading dynasties, who were 
usually returned without contest in the 1960s. 
From 1976 onwards, Prime Ministers were all 
non- tama-a-‘aiga title-holders, and the position 
tended to be filled by majority rule.55  
After the 1979 polls, a party-based system 
emerged, first as a result of the rise to power of 
the Human Rights Protection Party (HRPP), 
and then because the opposition also adopted 
party-style organisation. Despite the HRPP’s 
continuing hold on power throughout the period 
(with a brief exception in 1986-87) from 1983 
to the present, party allegiances remained fluid. 
In 1988, only the last minute defection of an 
opposition MP enabled the HRPP to retain 
its hold on office. In general, the number of 
successful candidates recorded as affiliated to 
the HRPP prior to Prime Ministerial elections 
tends to be far lower than that recorded once a 
new government has been formed. At that point, 
elected MPs gravitate towards the governing 
party in search of the rewards attached to office-
holding. This process was actively encouraged by 
the HRPP, which increased the constitutionally 
allowed number of cabinet portfolios from 8 to 12 
in 1991, introduced laws against party-hopping in 
2005 and created new ‘under-secretary’ positions 
for government backbenchers.56 
French Polynesia
French Polynesia, which has a majority 
Polynesian population and an 11% white 
population, uses a list ticket system like that 
in New Caledonia, but in its present form it is 
deliberately not proportional. Gaston Flosse, 
an ally of French President Jacques Chirac, 
led the government from 1991 and – owing 
to the difficulty in sustaining support for a 
French loyalist position in the predominantly 
Polynesian territory – favoured enhanced local 
autonomy. In the elections of May 7th 2001, his 
Tahoeraa Huiraatira won 29 seats, whereas the 
pro-independence Tavini Huiraatira obtained 13 
seats, resulting in Gaston Flosse serving his fifth 
term as President. In 2004, Flosse increased the 
number of seats from 49 to 57, introduced a 3% 
threshold, and provided for a 30% seat bonus for 
the party that received the most votes in each of 
the six multi-member constituencies, claiming 
this would increase stability of government.57 
Believing that the new majoritarian 
electoral laws would enhance his majority, 
Flosse persuaded President Chirac to dissolve 
the French Polynesian Territorial Assembly. At 
the consequent elections, held in May 2004, 
Flosse again triumphed in the outer islands, 
particularly the Marquesas and Gambier Islands 
and the Tuamoto Archipalago – where Catholic 
allegiances and fears of Tahitian domination over 
an independent nation encourage French loyalist 
affinities. But Tahoeraa Huiraatira was narrowly 
defeated in the large 37-member Windward 
Islands constituency by only 390 votes, thus 
missing out on the critical associated seat bonus.58 
Tahoeraa Huiraatira consequently failed to secure 
an absolute majority. Longstanding independence 
leader Oscar Temaru instead narrowly won the 
vote for the presidency. In the political battle that 
followed, Temaru was controversially ousted after 
a single defection from his Union for Democracy. 
Flosse regained the presidency, but tried to bolster 
his one-seat majority by calling fresh elections in 
the 37-member Windward Islands constituency 
(after Paris accepted his allegations of electoral 
irregularities in that constituency at the May 
2004 polls). Yet at consequent by-election, held 
in February 2005, the Union for Democracy 
acquired an increased share of the vote, leading 
to the restoration of the Temaru government.59 
Political controversy in French Polynesia came 
to centre, less on the independence question 
(to be indefinitely postponed), and more on 
alleged corruption and nepotism under the Flosse 
administration.
ETHNICALLY BIPOLAR 
CONFIGURATIONS
Fiji
In Fiji, conflict between the 52% indigenous 
Fijians and 44% Indo-Fijians has centred on 
electoral outcomes, with constitutional crises 
(1977) and coups (1987, 2000) following the 
election of governments largely backed by Indo-
Fijian voters. Electoral reform has consequently 
been the most politically sensitive issue in the 
country ever since the 1920s.
After colonisation in 1874, ethnic Fijians, 
who were suffering a catastrophic decline in 
population, were largely confined to their 
villages under a ‘Fijian administration’ governed 
by customary chiefs. From 1879, over 60,000 
labourers were brought from India as indentured 
labourers to cut sugar cane. Many stayed, and 
after indenture ended in 1916, took up positions 
as tenant farmers supplying cane to the Colonial 
Sugar Refining Company. As free labourers, 
living standards steadily improved and Indian 
population levels began to approach those of 
the indigenous Fijians. Demands for political 
rights led the colonial authorities to concede 
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Indian elected membership in the Legislative 
Council in 1929, but from separate communal 
constituencies.60 Subsequent agitation for a 
‘common roll’, closely linked to demands from 
London- and Kenyan-based Indian organisations 
with regard to the East African situation, seemed 
in the Fiji context to entail a bid for political 
power. In response, local Europeans and colonial 
officials increasingly allied themselves with 
indigenous Fijian politicians; an arrangement 
entrenched due to Fijian military participation 
during World War Two. Fijian population levels 
had begun to recover from the early 1920s, and 
local Europeans and colonial officials in the 
post-war Legislative Council reinvented their 
role as one of protecting ‘Fijian paramountcy’ (a 
doctrine also inspired by the 1920s East African 
situation).
Only as the dismantling of the colonial order 
commenced were the issues of political institutions 
capable of enabling post-independence 
democracy addressed. In 1965, the official 
majority was removed and a ‘cross-voting’ system 
was introduced. Registered citizens had four 
votes each, one of which was in an ethnically-
reserved-franchise constituency for their own 
‘Fijian’, ‘Indian’ or ‘general’ candidate. The 
other three were for ‘Indian’, ‘Fijian’ or ‘general’ 
candidates, in common roll constituencies. The 
system was aimed at stimulating the emergence 
of a centrist Malaysian-style Alliance Party with 
strong roots in the different ethnic communities. 
It did not succeed in this objective. No centrist 
party emerged able to capture substantial support 
in both communities. Voting remained largely 
along ethnic lines. Throughout 1970-1987, 
the consequence of having a first-past-the-post 
system with an ethnically bipolar structure was 
to encourage formation and retention of single 
homogenous ethnic parties. As one commentator 
put it, ‘political success in Fiji [was] … contingent 
upon maintaining solidarity in one’s own ethnic 
community while actively promoting disunity 
among the opposition’s’.61
The largely Fijian- and European-backed 
Alliance Party retained control of government 
throughout this period, with the exception of 
the two elections of April 1977 and 1987. The 
majoritarian electoral system ensured ‘winner 
takes all’ outcomes, which were not conducive to 
power-sharing arrangements. In 1977, the newly 
emergent Fijian Nationalist Party (FNP) acquired 
25% of the indigenous vote (in a manner that 
was notably disobedient to first-past-the-post’s 
electoral incentives), and split the Alliance Vote. 
The National Federation Party (NFP) narrowly 
scraped to victory, with 26 of the 52 seats. Instead 
of enabling the NFP to form a government, 
Governor General Ratu Sir Penaiia Ganilau 
returned the defeated Prime Minister Ratu Mara 
to office at the head of a minority administration 
pending fresh elections held in September 1977, 
which the Alliance Party won. When, a decade 
later, a predominantly Indian-backed coalition 
between the Fiji Labour Party (FLP) and NFP 
won the general elections of 1987, the newly 
installed government was, within two weeks, 
dislodged by a military coup. 
Backed by the country’s Great Council 
of Chiefs, a new post-coup constitution was 
introduced in 1990 which reserved the position 
of Prime Minister and President for indigenous 
Fijians. The cross-voting (or national) seats were 
abolished in favour of a wholly communal-based 
districting system. Fijians were granted 37 seats 
and Fiji Indians 27 seats, provisions which, it was 
hoped, would guarantee Fijian ‘paramountcy’. 
In fact, the electoral experience under the 1990 
constitution was a shift towards a multi-party 
setting. The coalition between the FLP and 
NFP broke down, with both parties vigorously 
competing for the Indian vote. Coup leader 
Sitiveni Rabuka’s Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei 
faced considerable internal party rivalry, and was 
challenged by several new Fijian parties, including 
the Fijian Association Party and the All National 
Congress as well as the earlier established FNP. 
Ironically, Rabuka found himself dependent on 
FLP support to secure his majority after the 1992 
polls.62 Domestic political difficulties, as well as 
international pressures, encouraged the Rabuka 
government to embark on a mid-decade review 
of the 1990 constitution.
As part of the new 1997 constitution, Fiji 
introduced the alternative vote system (AV), along 
with provisions for mandatory power-sharing. 
As with PNG’s LPV system (outlined above), 
voters rank candidates in order of preference 
and, during the count, lowest polling candidates 
are progressively eliminated until a victor is 
established. The main differences are that (i) 
Fiji’s system requires voters who mark preferences 
to rank 75% of candidates numerically to cast 
a valid ballot (whereas PNG’s system requires 
only 3 candidates to be ranked);63 and (ii) Fiji’s 
ballot papers have an ‘above-the-line’ section 
enabling voters to place a simple tick endorsing 
a political party thereby delegating decisions 
about subsequent preferences to that political 
party. Over 90% of Fiji’s voters took the latter 
option in 1999 and 2001, giving party officials 
extraordinary control over the re-allocation of 
preference votes. The system was designed, under 
the influence of questionable theories about 
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the benefits of the AV system in mitigating 
ethnic conflict, to encourage pre-election deals 
between political parties representing the ethnic 
Fijians and Indo-Fijians. Local parliamentarians, 
however, were not convinced that the AV system 
alone would ensure multi-ethnic government. 
As a result, provisions were added for mandatory 
power-sharing. All parties with more than 10% 
of seats in the house were entitled to cabinet 
portfolios. The widely expected result was the re-
election of Rabuka’s government, but with Indo-
Fijian opposition leader Jai Ram Reddy’s NFP 
henceforth playing a junior role in cabinet.  
Instead, the centrist Rabuka-Reddy coalition 
was heavily defeated at the May 1999 polls. The 
FLP, relying mainly on first preference support 
from the Indo-Fijian community combined with 
transfers of lower order ethnic Fijian preference 
votes under the control of party officials, found 
itself with an absolute majority (despite obtaining 
only 32.3% of the nationwide first preference 
vote). The country’s first ever Indo-Fijian Prime 
Minister, Mahendra Chaudhry, took office, at the 
head of a reformist coalition including several 
small Fijian-backed parties. Precisely a year later, 
that government was overthrown in a coup 
perpetrated by indigenous Fijian extremists, 
backed notably by many rank-and-file members 
and backbench MPs from parties whose leaders 
had joined the coalition government.64
After the May 2000 coup, the constitution 
was restored by Fiji’s Court of Appeal, paving 
the way for fresh elections, again held under the 
alternative vote system. At the 2001 polls, two 
exclusively ethnic-Fijian-backed political parties, 
the Soqosoqo ni Duavata ni Lewenivanua (SDL) 
and the Conservative Alliance- Matanitu Vanua 
(CAMV) secured the largest number of seats, and 
formed a coalition government (despite obtaining 
together only 35.7% of the first preference 
vote). A centrist alliance which called itself the 
‘Moderates Forum’ fared poorly. Moderate parties’ 
preferences served instead to elect the extremist 
Fijian parties in key marginal constituencies.65 
The FLP, reliant almost exclusively on the Indian 
vote (i.e., now without the 1999 preference 
transfers from its mostly defunct allied Fijian 
parties), was left with 27 seats. Unable to form 
a government, it nevertheless insisted on its 
right to inclusion in cabinet, based on the 
constitutional provision entitling all parties with 
10% or more of parliamentary seats to participate 
in cabinet. The result was a succession of legal 
challenges to the SDL-CAMV government, with 
the courts in each case upholding the FLP’s right 
to ministerial portfolios. The SDL responded by 
offering to incorporate the FLP by increasing the 
size of cabinet to 36 members. The ruling party 
hoped thereby to preserve intact its governing 
coalition and avoid sacking CAMV ministers. 
The FLP was to be awarded a host of minor 
portfolios, with controversial figures such as 
party leader Mahendra Chaudhry excluded from 
participation. Further court battles followed, 
culminating in the FLP finally opting for a 
position on the opposition benches as scheduled 
elections in 2006 loomed closer.  
New Caledonia
Like Fiji, New Caledonia is an ethnically 
bipolar society, but with a 34.1% white population 
and 44.1% Melanesian population and a more 
substantial ‘other’ grouping comprising Wallisian 
(9%), Indonesian (2.5%) and French Polynesian 
(2.6%) groups.66 Since the abolition of the Code 
de l’Indigénat in 1946, New Caledonia has not 
had the rigid compartmentalisation by ethnic 
group characteristic of Fiji. In 1951, the French 
National Assembly passed legislation resulting 
in the enfranchisement of close to 9,000 
Melanesians. In response, conservatives briefly 
secured a ‘double electoral college’ system in 
1952, with ethnically separate constituencies for 
the 80% majority Kanak east coast, but this was 
soon abandoned. Also in 1952, the two round 
(or double-ballot) system was replaced by a 
list proportional representation system with five 
electoral zones returning 25 members.67 
For most of the post-war years, the New 
Caledonian territorial assembly was dominated 
by the multi-ethnic and pro-autonomy Union 
Calédonien (UC), which was able to secure 
both Melanesian and liberal European support. 
Kanak calls for independence in the late 1970s, 
influenced by the inability of UC to achieve 
much in the way of self-government, led to the 
formation of a variety of breakaway socialist 
and pro-independence parties. In 1977, the UC 
itself adopted a pro-independence position. Most 
European UC members left the party during the 
1970s, many joining the conservative and anti-
independence settler party, the Rassemblement 
pour la Calédonie dans la Republique (RPCR).68 
Electoral laws promulgated by conservatives in 
the late 1970s raised the threshold required to 
secure seats in the territorial assembly to 7.5% 
and abolished proportional representation in 
the Governing Council. The objective was to 
exclude smaller Melanesian parties such as Parti 
de Libération Kanak (PALIKA – with 6.5% of 
the vote in 1977).69 Instead, it precipitated 
their unification: pro-independence groups 
aligned themselves behind a newly formed Front 
Indépendantiste (FI) which obtained 14 seats 
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as compared to the RPCR’s 15 seats in the 
1979 regional assembly (the FI was renamed 
Front de Libération Nationale Kanak et Socialiste 
[FLNKS] in 1984). During the 1980s, growing 
social conflict entailing land occupations, road-
bocks, assassinations, industrial sabotage and 
electoral boycotts, culminated in the 1988 Ouvea 
crisis, which resulted in the death of 19 pro-
independence demonstrators and six members of 
the government security forces and precipitated 
greater efforts by political leaders on both sides 
to secure a negotiated settlement. 
The 1988 Matignon Accord, agreed between 
RPCR and FLNKS leaders, included a 10-year 
‘rebalancing’ programme, entailing development 
projects for the majority Kanak north and the 
Loyalty Islands, and promised a referendum 
on independence a decade later. For electoral 
purposes, the territory was divided into three 
provinces, one each covering the south and 
north of the grand terre (main island) and 
another covering the Loyalty Islands. These 
returned, respectively, 32, 15 and 7 members to 
the 54-member New Caledonian Congress as 
well as electing members to separate provincial 
assemblies. Indigenous Kanaks predominate both 
in the Northern Province and in the Loyalty 
Islands whereas all other ethnic groups largely 
reside in the more populous Southern Province, 
also the most prosperous region and location of 
the capital, Noumea.70 With substantial support 
from minority groups as well as European settlers 
and some Melanesians, the RPCR was able 
to obtain the largest share of the vote in the 
Southern Province (52.5% in 1989, 46.4% in 
1995, 49.6% in 1999), and secured significant 
minority support in the Northern Province and 
even in the overwhelmingly indigenous Loyalty 
Islands.71 It was able to retain control over 
Congress, either alone or in coalition, through 
the 1990s.
The FLNKS, by contrast, witnessed mounting 
internal fissions. The two largest components of 
FLNKS, UC and PALIKA contested separately at 
elections held in 1995, 1999 and 2004. After the 
signing of the Noumea Accord in 1998, former 
UC leaders formed the breakaway Fédération des 
Comités de Co-ordination des Indépendantistes 
(FCCI) and coalesced with the RPCR to control 
the Congress. The Noumea Accord put back the 
scheduled vote on independence for a further 15-
20 years, established a Senate for Kanak chiefs, 
and provided for mandatory power-sharing, with 
all parties receiving in excess of 6 seats in the 
54-member Congress securing representation in 
government.72 At the 2004 polls, 31 distinct 
lists were fielded in the three provinces, with 
divisions becoming particularly acute among the 
Melanesian-backed parties. Inability to agree a 
unified list ensured that no Kanak party crossed 
the 5% electoral threshold in the Southern 
Province, and all six FLNKS senators in the 
south lost their seats.73 Fragmentation was not 
confined to the Kanak parties. Jacques Lafleur’s 
Rassemblement UMP (the renamed RPCR) saw 
its overall vote share fall from 38.8% to 24.4%, 
and lost 8 of its 24 seats at the 2004 polls. The 
newly formed centrist Avenir Ensemble secured 
23.8% of the overall vote (and 16 seats), and 
led the post-election government. Avenir, argues 
Nic Maclellan, is shifting the political agenda 
away from divisive ethnic issues towards a greater 
concern with ‘issues of corruption, cronyism and 
gender politics’.74
REPERCUSSIONS OF ELECTORAL 
LAWS
The contemporary political history of the Pacific 
is, as we have seen, littered with misconceived 
electoral reform initiatives, and institutional 
changes that had outcomes that varied markedly 
from what was anticipated by their architects. In 
New Caledonia, raising the threshold required 
for parties to secure representation in 1979 was 
intended to disadvantage radical Kanak parties. 
Instead, it brought them together, and enabled 
them temporarily to enter the local government 
in the early 1980s. Gaston Flosse’s introduction of 
a 30% seat bonus for the winning party in French 
Polynesia was devised to bolster the fortunes of his 
Tahoerra Huiraatira. Instead, it enabled his arch-
rival, Oscar Temaru, to take office in May 2004. 
Fiji’s 1965-1987 cross-voting system was intended 
to facilitate the emergence of a Malaysian-
style Alliance Party. Instead, it strengthened 
communal party machines which became adept at 
finding puppet candidates from the other ethnic 
group to field in the appropriate constituencies.75 
The post-coup 1990 constitution was intended 
to entrench indigenous Fijian ‘paramountcy’. 
Instead, coup leader Rabuka soon found himself 
reliant on support from the largely Indian-backed 
FLP to retain office. The alternative vote system 
was intended to encourage moderate candidates 
and coalitions based around policy agreements 
on ethnically sensitive issues. Instead, it sent 
its centrist architects to a crashing defeat in 
May 1999, and, in 2001, facilitated victory 
for an ethno-nationalist coalition that included 
supporters of the failed coup of May 2000. 
The anticipated Duvergerian inter-relation 
between the electoral system and party 
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polarisation did play some role in the political 
history of the bipolar countries, but, everywhere, 
other factors were of primary significance. 
Vanuatu’s francophone/anglophone divisions, 
and the indigenous/settler-descended cleavages 
in Fiji and New Caledonia, in the 1980s provided 
the critical impetus towards the formation of two-
party systems, rather than the logic of electoral 
laws. Even the no-party systems, whether or 
not they used single-member districts, often 
witnessed loosely bipolar-style cleavages centred 
on distinctions between those on the government 
side or on the opposition benches (for example, in 
Tuvalu, Kiribati and Samoa). Executive instability 
in such states was indicative of a tendency for 
government to only just secure its majority in 
parliament, providing other members with the 
incentive to group together to plot the next ‘no 
confidence’ challenge (a trend that can occur in 
any parliamentary system, whatever the electoral 
system). In the bipolar and party-based territories, 
electoral systems worked their influence at the 
margin, facilitating multi-partyism in situations 
already prone to greater political fragmentation 
or entrenching bipolarity in circumstances where 
political allegiances were already such as to pit 
two sides against each other. 
Nevertheless, the marginal influence was 
important. Electoral arrangements which served 
to break down polarised alignments in the political 
sphere eased the way to ethnic accommodation. 
In Fiji, inter-ethnic electoral alliances, which 
had become possible due to the introduction of 
the 25 new open or common roll constituencies 
in 1997, broke down after the first election 
under the AV system, and were in ruins after 
the May 2000 coup. The more centrist of the 
two largely Indian-backed parties, the NFP, did 
form a coalition with other ‘Moderates Forum’ 
parties in the run up to the 2001 polls, but it was 
emphatically defeated, and left for a second time 
with no seats in parliament.76 New Caledonia’s 
political parties, including both conservatives 
(for most of the post-war years) and Melanesian-
backed pro-independence parties (from the 
1970s) had a long history of infighting and 
splintering. The impact of electoral incentives 
in triggering greater unity among Melanesian 
parties was evident in 1979 when the threshold 
was raised to 7.5%. As polarisation increased in 
the 1980s, elections served as referenda on the 
independence issue or were boycotted by Kanaks, 
and the bipolar division became more entrenched. 
In the wake of the Matignon and Noumea 
Accords, an increasing number of parties again 
emerged and as they did so coalitions became 
increasingly unavoidable. Whereas Fiji, under 
AV, saw increasing numbers of voters line up 
behind ethnic political parties, one representing 
Indo-Fijians77 and the others representing ethnic 
Fijians,78 New Caledonia’s ethnic fissures have 
become less marked in the wake of the electoral 
boycotts and violence of the mid-1980s, with 
centrists securing control over Congress in a 
multi-party coalition in 2004. 
Other technical aspects of the electoral system 
also influenced Pacific party constellations. Laws 
on party finances, crossing the floor and official 
designations on ballot papers served to alter 
parliamentary balances between independents 
and party-aligned MPs. Constitutional provisions 
for parliamentary offices for opposition or 
independent leaders encouraged greater 
coherence amongst MPs not in government. 
French Polynesia’s list PR system, with its 37-
member Windward Islands constituency, did not 
encourage multi-partyism after the introduction 
of a 30% majority seat bonus (which turned the 
classic PR system into its opposite). Electoral 
thresholds in the French territories discouraged 
tiny parties. Split-format ballots in Fiji gave 
party officials an extraordinary influence over the 
distribution of preference votes. Mandatory power 
sharing provisions regarding cabinet composition, 
if anticipated in pre-election party alignments, 
discouraged smaller parties which might diminish 
broader ethnic representation in cabinet. Only 
once all these influences are weighed up, together 
with the extent of heterogeneity and the electoral 
laws, can one establish the likely repercussions 
for party polarisation.   
A key issue in many of the Pacific countries 
is not whether the electoral system encourages a 
two-party system or a multiparty constellation, 
but whether it encourages any party system at all. 
Single-member districts may have eased the path 
to the retention of no-party systems, with MPs 
often selected, at least in rural areas, on the basis 
of position within local hierarchies or community 
standing.79 Yet this was also the case with multi-
member districts, for example in Nauru, Tuvalu 
or Kiribati. The multi-member single non-
transferable vote system (SNTV) in Vanuatu 
initially coexisted with what was probably the 
strongest party-based system in the post-colonial 
Pacific, but as the independence issue faded, 
parties splintered and independents proliferated. 
The rise and fall of Vanuatu’s two-party-based 
system had little to do with the logic of electoral 
laws, although SNTV may have encouraged 
feuding politicians to fall back on regional 
fiefdoms. Where electoral laws had most impact 
in encouraging the formation of political parties 
was in New Caledonia and French Polynesia, 
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but here too other complementary influences 
were the inheritance of strong traditions of party 
politics from mainland France and polarization 
around the independence issue. 
Leaving aside the ethnically bipolar states 
(which face distinctive problems), contemporary 
reform objectives in most Pacific Island countries 
may focus on encouraging the emergence of 
party systems, but the primary objective is 
usually strengthening executive authority. In 
this, Samoa’s Human Rights Protection Party 
(HRPP) has proved most successful, having 
survived in office, with only one brief exception, 
for over a quarter of a century. Samoa initially 
witnessed a high degree of incumbent turnover 
and, until 1979, had an assembly dominated by 
independents. The HRPP proved able to diminish 
scope for parliamentary and extra-parliamentary 
challenges to its rule, by extending parliamentary 
terms from 3 to 5 years, by expanding cabinet 
size and, most controversially, by use of the fruits 
and achievements of office to procure political 
support. Although the opposition also adopted 
political party organisation from 1982 onwards, 
the itu Malo (the government or ‘victorious side’) 
triumphed over the itu Vaivai (‘losing side’). 
Samoa increasingly has a single executive party 
dominating a loosely party-aligned assembly 
with many ‘independents’. After elections, 
the government consolidates control over the 
assembly, by drawing hitherto non-aligned or 
opposition MPs across the floor. The system 
strengthens executive authority, but without 
doing so to such a degree as to empower an 
authoritarian regime (although some political 
controversy centres on this possibility). Most 
importantly, the Samoan party system was not 
a top-down creature of institutional engineers, 
but a home-grown product of shifting political 
forces and the decline of tama-a-‘�iga (ruling 
chiefly families) parliamentary authority during 
the 1970s.
Party-centred political development is not 
an inevitable accompaniment of human history. 
Pacific nations are sometimes compared to 
Greek city states,80 but ancient Athens, that 
‘cradle of democracy’, did not have a party-
based system. Many Pacific states are similar 
in size to shire counties or town councils in 
metropolitan countries, which often have more 
fluid and personalised alignments than national 
parliaments or lack political parties altogether. 
Where domestic issues have emerged around 
which party systems crystallize, as in the Marshall 
Islands or Samoa, these on balance probably assist 
effective government. But there seems little logic 
in forcing party organisation on countries like 
FSM, Palau, or Tuvalu on the dubious grounds that 
political parties are indispensable for democracy 
or stability. Government instability in the Cook 
Islands, despite the party-centred system, indicates 
that legislation aimed at obliging MPs to join 
political parties is unlikely to be greatly effective. 
Where political parties are nothing more than 
vehicles for ambitious leaders to capture power, 
they inevitably remain weak and lack broad 
legitimacy. Elaborate institutional engineering 
projects are much more likely to create these 
types of parties than genuine watchdog parties or 
truly hegemonic governing parties. The notion 
that collective action and ideological affinity can be 
forced top-downwards by statute is indicative of a 
topsy-turvy style of thinking. 
More effective reform proposals would aim 
instead at harnessing existing local pressures 
for greater choice, enhancing direct popular 
controls over representatives and governments, 
and experimenting with new checks and balances 
over executive authority. A greater separation of 
executive and legislative powers, coupled with 
effective popular recall systems and a strong 
judiciary, offers a better way of avoiding the 
problem of hamstrung assemblies that serve only 
as arenas for the pursuit of personal ambition 
than institutional experiments designed to trigger 
the emergence of party-based systems.  
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